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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2058 
________________ 
 
ERIE MOLDED PLASTICS, INC. 
 
v. 
 
NOGAH, LLC 
 
           John J. Richardson, Esq.* and Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP*, 
Appellants 
 
          *(Pursuant to 12(a) Fed. R. A. P.) 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-00239) 
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2013) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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Nogah LLC (―Nogah‖) retained John J. Richardson and Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 
(jointly and severally, ―Richardson‖) to represent it in a breach-of-warranty lawsuit filed 
by Erie Molded Plastics, Inc. (―Erie‖).  Shortly thereafter, Richardson moved to withdraw 
as Nogah’s counsel, citing lack of payment.  The District Court denied Richardson’s 
motion with prejudice, and held that Richardson may not withdraw from the case unless 
substitute counsel enters an appearance or Nogah accepts a voluntary judgment.  
Richardson appealed.
1
  We reverse with instructions to grant Richardson’s withdrawal.  
I. 
In November 2011, Richardson filed on behalf of Nogah an answer and 
affirmative defenses to Erie’s complaint, and also asserted counterclaims against Erie.  
Additionally, Richardson participated in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) 
conference with Erie’s counsel and made the required Rule 26(a) disclosures.  Less than 
four months into Richardson’s representation, Nogah had an outstanding balance in 
excess of $5,000 for fees and expenses owed to Richardson.  Despite repeated requests 
from Richardson, Nogah failed to satisfy its financial obligations.  Additionally, Nogah 
advised Richardson that it no longer had the resources necessary to fund any future 
litigation in the underlying suit, as it would be going out of business.  
Richardson provided notice to Nogah via correspondence, dated March 7, 2012 
and March 12, 2012, of his intention to file a motion to withdraw as counsel.   Richardson 
moved to withdraw on March 14, 2012, pursuant to Local Rule 83.2(C)(4) and 
                                              
1
There is no Appellee in this matter, as Erie and Nogah take no position before us.  
Indeed, both litigants have opted not to file a brief. 
 
3 
 
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(a)(5).
2
  Richardson’s motion informed 
the Court that Nogah had advised him that it (1) will not be able to pay the fees owed, (2) 
no longer had the resources necessary to fund any future litigation in this matter, and (3) 
will be going out of business. 
On March 26, 2012, the District Court denied Richardson’s motion with prejudice.  
The Court explained: ―It has been the law for the better part of two centuries that a 
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.‖  App. at 3 
(citation omitted).   As a result, the Court then held that ―[c]ounsel may not withdraw 
from the case without substitute counsel entering an appearance or without [Nogah] 
taking a voluntary judgment.‖  Id.  Richardson timely appealed.3 
II. 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332.  We have ―jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
                                              
2Although Richardson moved in the District Court, and again on appeal, pursuant 
to Rule 1.16(a)(5), no such rule exists; Rule 1.16(b)(5) is the appropriate rule.  
 
3
 Our consideration of appellate jurisdiction is limited to orders denying motions 
for leave to withdraw in civil cases.  We express no views as to whether appellate 
jurisdiction exists for orders granting withdrawal motions in civil cases or orders 
concerning withdrawal in criminal cases. 
Furthermore, although we held in United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 
1993), that an order requiring unwilling counsel to provide unpaid, standby legal services 
to a former client was not an appealable collateral order, that does not apply here.  While 
there may be some parallels between the Bertoli order and the order before us, in Bertoli 
we were concerned with the fair and speedy disposition of criminal cases and the 
disruption caused by counsel taking an interlocutory appeal.  By contrast, here we 
conclude the issue of denying withdrawal is so clearly severable from the underlying civil 
litigation that an interlocutory appeal would not foster the risks of disruption that would 
counsel against appellate review. 
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the United States‖ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and emphasis omitted).  The 
collateral order doctrine—first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949)—provides that there is a ―small class‖ of collateral rulings that, although 
they do not terminate the litigation, are appropriately deemed ―final‖ under § 1291.  
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).  That small class 
comprises decisions that (1) conclusively determine the disputed issue, (2) resolve 
important issues separate from the merits, and (3) are effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from the final judgment in the underlying action.  See Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 
F.3d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2000).   
We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  First, the District Court’s 
ruling is conclusive on the issue before us because it held, with prejudice, that Richardson 
is prohibited from withdrawing as counsel unless (1) substitute counsel enters an 
appearance or (2) Nogah accepts a voluntary judgment.  See Fidelity Nat’l Ins. Co. of 
N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2002).  Second, 
whether Richardson must continue representing Nogah is an important issue that is 
unrelated to the merits of the underlying breach-of-contract action.  See Whiting v. 
Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1999).  Finally, the ruling Richardson appeals is, as a 
practical matter, unable to be remedied if an error is determined in a post-judgment 
appeal.  It would then be too late to redress the harm Richardson seeks to avoid.  See 
Rivera-Domenech v. Calvesbert Law Offices PSC, 402 F.3d 246, 249 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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III. 
We review a district court’s denial of a request by counsel to withdraw from 
representation for abuse of discretion.  Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 
679 (3d Cir. 1986).  For the reasons that follow, we believe that threshold was met here. 
As a general rule, if a corporation appears in federal court, it may do so only 
through licensed counsel.  Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory 
Council, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993).   Recognizing this rule, in Ohntrup we 
―conclude[d] that a law firm is entitled to withdraw once the firm demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the district court that its appearance serves no meaningful purpose, 
particularly insofar as an opposing interest is concerned.‖  Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 680.  
 To repeat, the District Court held that Richardson can only withdraw if (1) 
substitute counsel enters an appearance or (2) Nogah accepts a voluntary judgment.  That 
decision runs counter to our holding in Ohntrup, as Richardson is entitled to withdraw 
once his appearance continues to serve no meaningful purpose.   
 Applying that rule here, Nogah engaged Richardson, did not pay for his services, 
told him it could not do so in the future, it was going out of business, no judgment has 
been entered against it, and neither Erie nor Nogah opposes Richardson’s motion to 
withdraw at this time.  If Richardson were permitted to withdraw, one of two events 
would happen: (1) Nogah would be forced to retain new licensed counsel, or (2) if Nogah 
failed to retain substitute counsel, it would be subject to default judgment, because it can 
only appear in federal court through licensed counsel. 
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 If Nogah retained new counsel, Erie’s civil suit would proceed through the 
District Court as initially planned.  Thus, Erie would suffer no harm or prejudice if 
Nogah retains substitute counsel.  If Nogah failed to retain substitute counsel and default 
judgment were entered against it, resolution of the case would be expedited, as opposed 
to delayed, and Erie would secure a judgment in its favor.  Again, this result would not 
prejudice Erie.   
We also note that this case differs from Ohntrup, where we determined that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow counsel to withdraw.  There 
an opposing party had obtained a favorable judgment against the defendant, and due to 
communication barriers between the parties (the defendant corporation was located in 
Turkey), the Court found that active representation by counsel to the foreign defendant 
was necessary to allow the opposing party to obtain satisfaction of its judgment.  
Ohntrup, 802 F.2d 679.  Here there is no judgment and no indication that communication 
problems would prevent Erie from obtaining satisfaction of a default judgment if one 
were entered.  Moreover, there is no suggestion that Erie’s interests would be prejudiced 
by Richardson’s withdrawal.   
It is with this background that no meaningful purpose is served by forcing 
Richardson to remain in this case.  We thus reverse the District Court’s denial of 
Richardson’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, and order that counsel be permitted to 
withdraw. 
